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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
the degree of likelihood or remoteness of the contingency coupled with the
intention of the settlor must be given full consideration.18 Otherwise liability
may be incurred by the discovery of a valueless gossamer thread of possession
or enjoyment.17
Under the decision rendered in the instant case tax liability may be
incurred irrespective of the decedent's intention, if he did not divest himself
completely of all remote possibility of regaining the property. It is difficult to
perceive that the decedent intended to make an incomplete gift by studiously
reserving through silent operation of law a remote possibility of regaining
possession of the corpus. The absence of intention is even more apparent if
considered in the light of the status of the local law with respect to the rever-
sionary interest at the time the trust indenture was created.18
The decision in the Spiegel case may meet with considerable criticism
because the majority seemingly ignored the settlor's intent as well as the
statutory language of 811(c). Yet the conclusion reached was merely the
logical culmination of the trend which has prevailed in the Court as presently
constituted.' 9 Perhaps the result of the principal case may be avoided by
naming the United States Government or a charitable organization as the
ultimate remainderman. 2
TAXATION-TRANSFER TO TAKE EFFECT IN
POSSESSION OR ENJOYMENT AFTER DEATH
In 1924, decedent, then twenty-one and unmarried, executed a trust,
naming himself and two brothers as co-trustees. Decedent reserved no power
to alter, amend, or revoke, but the income from the trust was to be paid to him
for life, and on his death the principal was payable to his surviving issue.
reverter at death, in the case of one of these trusts, was $.000000163 out of a corpus of ap-
proximately $395,000 and in the case of the other, $.0000000000876 out of a total value of
$338,000. The return of the property in the third trust hinged upon the prior death of the
grantor's daughter, the latter's issue and the latter distributees in the event of intestacy. The
reverter at death was estimated as $.000046 as compared with a corpus of $362,000. Under
the provisions of the fourth suit, which were similar to those of the third, the reverter was
worth $.0001814 out of a trust principal of over $348,000. In Smith M. Flinkinger, P-H
1943 T.C. Memo. Dec. Serv. 1 43,455 (1943) the actuarial value of reverter at death was
worth twenty-nine cents out of a trust corpus of $444,000.
16. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 58 F. Supp. 565, 566 (Ct.
Cl. 1945). Contra: Thomas v. Graham, 158 F.2d 561, 563 (C. C. A. 5th 1946).
17. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in the present case at 345.
I8. See Mr. Justice Burton, dissenting in the instant case at 310-313, where he questions
the law of Illinois with respect to possibility of reverter. Mr. Justice Frankfurter suggests
that the case be remanded to the state court to secure an adjudication on this issue, possibly
through the procedure of a declaratory judgment. Id. at 348.
19. Helvering v. Hallock, supra; Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Rothensies, supr o;
Commissioner v. Estate of Field, supra; Goldstone v. United States, supra; Commissioner
v. Church's Estate, 69 Sup. Ct. 322 (1949).
20. Note, The New Hallock Regulation, 2 TAx L. Rav. 94, 10 (1946). See Spencer,
The Federal Estate Tax on Inter-Vivos Trusts: A Common Sense Rule for Hallock Cases,
59 HARv. L. REv. 43 (1945).
CASES NOTED
If decedent left no surviving issue, the principal was payable to brothers and
sisters surviving decedent, the children of any deceased brothers or sisters
taking per stirpes. At the time the trust was created decedent had a brother
and sister and four half brothers. At decedent's death, without issue, in 1939,
he was survived by sixteen persons who were brothers and sisters of the
half blood and full blood, or the children of such brothers and sisters. The
actuarial value of any reversionary interest was less than three one-thousandths
of one per cent. The Commissioner included the corpus in decedent's gross
estate under section 811(c) of the Internal Revenue Code, which taxes
transfers "intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death."
Held, that where the settlor retained possession and enjoyment of property
for life, the property is taxable under this transfer clause even though the
settlor divested himself of legal title, for until the settlor's death the benefi-
ciaries cannot get possession or enjoyment, hence until then the gift is not
complete. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Church's Estate, 69 Sup. Ct.
322 (1949) (three justices dissenting).
The instant case illustrates the continued groping by the Supreme Court
to define transfers which are "intended to take effect in possession or enjoy-
ment at or after death." I The problem of statutory construction, i.e., of
defining the "string" under this transfer clause, has been the chief difficulty
confronting the Court. Thus where a trust was created by A, the income of
which was to be paid to B until five years after A's death, with a remainder
over to C, it was held that there was no string merely because the termination
of one estate and the beginning of another were fixed by A's death, since
nothing passed out of the control, possession, or enjoyment of A at his
death.2 And in May v. Heiner,3 overruled by the principal case, it was held
that the transfer clause did not apply where A reserved the trust income for
life with remainder over to B, for the reason that the trust deed fixed the title,
and that A's interest in the trust income did not pass, but rather was obliter-
ated, by A's death. Thus after May v. Heiner the string meant legal title. Since
the transfer clause made no mention of title, the Commissioner then attempted
to tax transfers reserving life estates, but was defeated in three per curiam
1. This clause has been interpreted as applying in a case where property was deeded
with a reservation of a life income. Reish, Adm'r v. Commonwealth, 106 Pa. 521 (1884).
The majority of states are in accord. See Knouff, Death Taxes on Completed Transfers
Inter Vivos, 36 MIcH L. REV. 1284, 1298 (1938) ; Rottschaefer, Taxation of Transfers Tak-
ing Effect in Possession at Grantor's Death, 26 IOWA L. REV. 514, 516 (1941). The clause
appeared in the first Federal Estate Tax Act. Revenue Act of 1916, § 202(b), 39 STAT.
777 (1916) (". . . to reach substitutes for testamentary dispositions and runs to prevent
the evasion of the estate tax"). In 1900 it had been held that the United States had power
to tax legacies. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900). The constitutionality of the es-
tate tax prevailed over arguments that it was a direct tax and that it interfered with
state laws of distribution, New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921). But the tax
was held not applicable where the passage of the act followed the completed transfer and
preceded the transferor's death. Shwab v. Doyle, 258 U.S. 529 (1942).
2. Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339 (1929).
3. 281 U.S. 238 (1930).
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opinions.' At the insistence of the Treasury Department, Congress subsequently
enacted the Joint Resolution of March 31, taxing transfers reserving life
estates. This resolution was interpreted as being prospective only.'
Difficulty in defining the string was similarly presented in transfers not
involving reserve life estates. Thus where A deeded real estate to B for
life and, on condition that 13 survive hin, in fee simple, A's reversion in fee
pulled the property within the transfer clause. 6 This rule was later restricted
so that if the devisee's interest was fully vested even though subject to divest-
ment at the time of the settlor's death, there was no string.7 This distinction
between vested and contingent remainders was rejected in the celebrated
Hallock case,8 which found a harmonizing principle in Klein v. United States,"
stating medieval property concepts as to the necessity of continuous seisin
preclude a workable tax system dealing largely with intangible wealth. Subse-
quent litigation has reemphasized the Hallock doctrine.'0
In the instant case although the only issue presented by the parties in
the Tax Court was whether there existed a possibility of reverter within the
Hallock rule, some uncertainty as to harmonizing principles was indicated
after the case reached the Supreme Court in that an order was entered restor-
ing the case to the docket and propounding questions broader in scope than
those originally argued."1
The facts of the principal case would apj)ear to weaken the result, for
since the transfer did not pfovide for all possible contingencies, it might have
been held that there was a sufficient contingent reversionary interest as to come
within the doctrine of the Halfock and companion cases. Apparently wishing
to escape dependence on state law, however, the Court rested the decision on
the incompatibility of the May and Hallock cases. But the Hallock case did not
expressly overrule May v. Heiner, nor can it he said to have done so sub silentio.
There is an important distinction in that in the Hallock case there was an
uncertainty due to a contingent reversionary interest terminable at the grantor's
death that the remaindernan would ever possess and enjoy the property,
whereas in the May case there was no such uncertainty. Thus it appears that
the May and Haltock cases can maintain at least a cool friendship.
An additional reason for differing with the Court's opinion arises in its
4. Morsman v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 783 (1931); Burnet v. Northern Trust Co., 283
U.S. 782 (1931); McCormick v. Burnet, 283 US. 784 (1931).
5. Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303 (1938), But see E. Pennington Person, 36 B.T.A.
5 (1937) (where the court held the resolution applicable to subsequent additions to prior
transfers).
6. Klein v. United States. 283 U.S. 231 (1931).
7. Helvering v. St. Louis Trust Co., 296 U.S. 39 (1935) ; Becker v. St. Louis Trust
Co,, 296 U.S. 48 (1935).
8. Helvering v. lallock, 309 U.S. 106 (1940).
9. 283 U.S. 2.31 (1931).
10. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., v. Rothensies, 324 U.S. 108 (1945) ; Comniission-
er v. Estate of Field, 324 U.S., 325 U.S. 687 (1945).
11. Journal Supremne Court, 297-298, June 21, 1948.
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break with established precedent. Although Frankfurter, J., in dissenting,
strongly urged application of the doctrine of stare decisis, the majority drew
comfort from the opinion rendered by the same Justice in the Hallock case.
It is to he remembered that there the Court was confronted with the St. Louis
Trust cases which had been decided only five years previously, and which
appeared to conflict with the Klein case. But here the latest decision was
eleven years old.' 2 Moreover, there were no conflicting opinions. The decisions
uniformly exempted pre- 19 31 transfers reserving life estates.
Unlike the Hallock case, there is present in the principal case an element
of reliance by the taxpayer. The decisions exempting pre-1 9 31 transfers were
rendered during the decedent's lifetime. The Treasury regulations complied
with such decisions.13 In the Halock case, on the other hand, the settlements
had been made, and the settlors had died before the decisions had been rendered
in the St. Louis Trust cases.
Unlike the 1a/lock situation, the earlier decisions in this case were not
enveloped in congressional silence, but rather were followed by prompt action
leading to changes which were intended to be prospective only.' Moreover,
Congress can not be said to be ignorant of an interpretation "that came like a
bombshell," 15 and on which there was a full debate resulting in only partial
modification.
Thus it would appear that the Court's break with precedent is not
warranted by the facts of the principal case.
A cryptic dictum in the principal case is the statement that, "an estate
tax cannot be avoided by any trust transfer except by a bona fide transfer in
which the settlor absolutely, unequivocally, irrevocably, and without possible
exception parts with all of his title . . ." indicates a possible extension 9 f the
Clifford case."M In that case income of five-year trust, although payable
to the settlor'i wife, was held taxable to the settlor. The apparently indis-
pensable factors were (1) a short term trust, (2) settlor as sole trustee, and
(3) a family relationship. It is clear that these factors were not present under
the facts of the Church case.
Two probable consequences of the decisions in the principal case are:
(I) clogging of the operation of regulations promulgated by the Treasury in
1946,1 7 which set up a test based on the difference between a reversion contin-
gent upon the grantor's death, and a reversion dependent upon some other
contingency. The decision is broad enough to render the survivorship test
12. l-assett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303 (1938).
13. U.S. Treas. Reg. 37, Art. 24 (1916).
14. See e.g., Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means on Revision, 1932,
72d Cong., ist Sess. 7, 42-43; Hearings before Committee on Finance on ]'he Revenue
Act of 1932, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 33, 51 ; 75 Cowr. REc. 5787, 7241 (1932).
15. 74 CoNG,. R.c. 7078 (1931).
16. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
17. U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.17, as amended, T. D. 5512 (1946).
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olsolete; (2) some relief measure similar to that passed after the Hallock
case.18 This step should be taken, in all fairness, at least in those cases where
the decedent has created the trust before 1931 and has refrained from relin-
quishing his life estate in reliance upon Supreme Court decisions and Treasury
regulations.
VENUE-EFFECT OF THE NEW JUDICIAL CODE ON THE
FEDERAL EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY ACT
In a suit under the Federal Employer's Liability Act by an employee of
the defendant railroad company to recover damages for injuries sustained by
him during the course of his employment, the defendant moved for an order
transferring the cause to the United States District Court in Ohio, where the
injuries occurred, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. A, § 1404(a).' Venue under the
FELA 2 is in the district where the defendant resides, or in which the cause
of action arose, or in which the defendant shall be doing business at the time of
commencing the action. Section 1404(a) provides in essence that a district
court may transfer any civil action to any other district where the action might
have been brought, for convenience of parties or in the interest of justice. Held,
motion denied, Section 1404(a) is not applicable to actions brought under
the FEI.A. Pascarella v. New York Cent. R. R., 81 F. Supp. 95 (E. D. N. Y.
1948).
Section 1404(a) of the new Judicial Code is similar to the doctrine of
forum non conveniens 3 which is enforced in the federal courts. 4 However, as
to actions brought under the FELA the doctrine has not been applied. It has
been held that once the criteria of venue is satisfied, an action under the FELA
should not be dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens, that venue
in the FELA is an inherent part of the employer's liability, 6 that the venue
right given to a plaintiff under the FELA should not be limited or abridged, 7
and that the privilege of venue conferred by the FELA is absolute.8 In
Baltimore & Ohio R. R, v. Kepner 0 the railroad sought in an Ohio court to
enjoin Kepner from prosecuting an action in a federal court in New York.
18. See T. D. 5008 (1940) ; U.S. Treas. Reg. 105. § 18.17 (1934 ed).
1. Based on 36 STAT. 1103 (1911), 39 SrAT. 851 (1916), 28 U. S. C., §§ 119, 163
(1940).
2. 36 STAT. 291 (1910), as amended, 36 STAr. 1167 (1911), 45 U. S. C. § 56 (1940).
3. "The principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may resist imposition
upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue
statute." See Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501, 507 (1947).
4. Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert, supra.
5. Butts v. Southern Pac. R. R., 69 F. Supp. 895 (S. D. N. Y. 1947).
6. Akerly v. New York Cent. R, R., 168 F.2d 812 (C. C. A. 6th 1948).
7. Stierhoff v. Chesapeake & 0. R. R., 8 F. R. D. 54 (S. D. N. Y. 1947).
8. Sacco v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 56 F. Supp. 959 (E. D. N. Y. 1944).
9. 314 U. S. 44 (1941).
